Year
2002
Abstract
In the wake of September 11, 2001 there has been an increased focus on the nuclear industry and its vulnerability to terrorism/sabotage. A particular emphasis has been placed on spent fuel shipments as a result of the notification by the Secretary of Energy to the State of Nevada that he will recommend that a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license application be made for Yucca Mountain as a high-level waste (HLW) repository. This notoriety is, however, somewhat misplaced because there are few spent fuel shipments currently, but shipments could occur in 2005 to support the Private Fuel Storage facility in Utah or in 2010 when HLW shipments to Yucca Mountain could begin. Fortunately, there have been a number of tests and analyses that define the likely impact of optimally successful attacks on spent fuel casks. The scenarios treated frequently relate to weapon technology usually referred to high energy density devices (HEDDs), which may be thought of as typical of anti-armor weapons. Of the 2 to 3 million shipments per year of radioactive material, spent fuel will never be more than a very small percentage. However, materials shipped more frequently can present potential hazards as severe as those from release of spent fuel. The broader picture of public vulnerability to potential harm from intentional releases of radioactive materials other than spent fuel is presented here in a in a semi-quantitative analysis based on shipment quantities and well established hazard indices. This information and a more detailed review of the extent of primary data and analyses of spent fuel subject to HEDD effects is included in this paper. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, specific nuclear payloads that are used in the analysis are not identified. This paper refers to different types of shipments as Payload 1, Payload 2, etc.