Overcoming Challenges In Establishing And Maintaining A State System Of Accounting For And Control Of Nuclear Material: A Perspective From Southeast Asia

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has always been a strong supporter of the nuclear non-proliferation regime whether being through its active support within the relevant international organisations, or the ratification, by its Member States, of the related international instruments. In the field of safeguards, ASEAN Member States have all concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) therefore meeting their obligations under the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is in such a context that all ASEAN Member States have accepted that the IAEA applies safeguards for verifying that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States’ main obligations under a comprehensive safeguards agreement include, inter alia: the provision of information to the IAEA (e.g. reports, etc.); the provision of access to the IAEA, including though the conduct of inspections; the establishment and maintenance of a State system of accounting for and control of (SSAC) nuclear material. States’ ability to provide the IAEA with accurate information and access, including in a timely manner, relies substantially on the effectiveness of the SSAC, which typically also comprises an authority responsible for safeguards implementation. For many States in the Southeast Asia, establishing both an authority and an SSAC comes with challenges, including: the lack of understanding of and expertise in the nuclear field; difficulties in securing human and financial resources; or ensuring domestic coordination between governmental entities. Such difficulties are often exacerbated for States with very little or no nuclear material. The purpose of the paper is to explore these challenges and provide, based on personal experience in establishing an SSAC and interacting with regional partners, recommendations for States to better meet their safeguards obligations in light of their comprehensive safeguards agreements. It will also look at outreach activities conducted by the IAEA and provide insight on how those activities could better support States in meeting their SSAC-related needs in an effective and comprehensive manner, therefore, reinforcing the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.