Year
2000
Abstract
The future of strengthened safeguards rests on the successful implementation of Integrated Safeguards achieved through openness and transparency. As part of this future, Integrated Safeguards must allow the IAEA to shift from the traditional, prescriptive, facility-driven criteria approach to an information-based and analysis-driven state-level one. Realizing that demands for ever-increasing Agency resources cannot be met, Member States and the Agency are faced with the challenge of finding a proper balance between traditional and Protocol activities. The principal theme of this paper is that a high degree of openness and transparency, especially over nuclear inventories and related fuel cycle activities, yields greater options in balancing traditional and Protocol verification activities, taking into account technological factors and resource constraints. Based on this assumption, the proposed State-level Integrated Safeguards Approach for Canada embraces the concepts of openness and transparency. The foundation of the Approach is an extensive declaration, accounting for past, present and future activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, in addition to near-real time reporting of nuclear material movements as well as enhanced access, including remote monitoring, to nuclear fuel cycle locations. The Integrated Safeguards Approach for Canada also endorses movement away from facility-specific activities and conclusions towards a state-level system. This paper will describe the proposed Integrated Safeguards Approach for Canada. The approach is designed to give the IAEA a clear and complete picture of nuclear inventories and activities in the State which is to be followed by extensive analysis of the data and, when necessary, on-site inspection/visit activities by the Agency. The proposal suggests a verification regime strategically targeted at inventories and activities reported under existing Safeguards Agreements (INFCIRC/153) and the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540).