Year
2013
Abstract
Compared with safeguards, international arrangements for nuclear security are weak. Participation in the relevant treaties is far from universal, there are no binding international standards, no international inspections, and no international reporting and accountability mechanisms. The IAEA’s authority is limited to recommendations and advice. Most experts agree on the need for peer reviews and sharing of best practices, but action in this regard is entirely voluntary. Reaching global consensus on addressing these shortcomings is a major challenge. In the meantime, two broad approaches suggest themselves – it should be easier to develop solutions on a regional basis, where a smaller number of states are involved and common interests are more apparent; and where formal agreements are difficult and time-consuming to achieve, practical steps may be possible through informal arrangements facilitated by NGOs. These broad approaches could converge, i.e. there could be informal regional arrangements facilitated by and through NGOs. Given that Asia is the largest growth area for nuclear power, Asia or the Asia-Pacific region should be considered a priority area for efforts to develop regional arrangements of this kind. At present there is no NGO in the Asia-Pacific that has a specific remit for nuclear security. This seems an obvious role for the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), but the members of APSN have yet to decide in favour of this. The principal NGO working in this field is the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS). While WINS is a global rather than regionally-based organisation, it has many members from the Asia-Pacific region and no doubt could develop a regionally-focused program of activities if there was sufficient demand for this. Other entities that could have an important role in this context, though not NGOs as such, are the various centres of excellence for nuclear security that have been or are being established in the region.