Nuclear Security in the Mining and Transport of Uranium Fuel

Year
2015
Author(s)
Gerrit Botha - North West University - School of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering, South Africa
Philip Glasner - University of Salzburg – Department of Geoinformatics – Z_GIS, Austria
Jeff Bannon - Vienna University of Technology –Atominstitut, Austria
Anthonie Cilliers - North West University - School of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering, South Africa
Abstract
In order to manage nuclear materials and the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons, the international community has set up safeguard systems to monitor and control activities related to processing of nuclear materials. These safeguards entail controlling the processing and enriching technologies of states and industries within international agreements. The production of nuclear materials has two components, natural resources such as uranium, and production technology to produce required grade of material required. Safeguard systems are set in place to control and monitor the production technologies. Compliance to safeguards can be difficult to enforce and many political interventions are required to ensure compliance. Being able to audit and track the production of natural nuclear resources will assist in alleviating some of the pressure on safeguards and political interventions. The quantity and location of global Uranium reserves are well known, with the majority reserves located in developing countries. The official production of nuclear materials from these locations is subjected to safeguards monitoring and controls. However, there are no international controls established for the prevention of uranium ore and other less refined uranium ore byproducts from being smuggled or leaking from uranium mining and production facilities into unmonitored production streams or into the black market for resale. This paper explores current methods and systems in place to monitor and audit natural uranium resources as they move through a mining facility’s processing streams, as well as the reporting mechanisms to account for events where uranium ore and related byproducts could get lost or become unaccounted for. It proposes a methodology for a systems engineering approach to control the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle in developing countries with limited financial resources or regulatory oversight to prevent the diversion of uranium for resale in the black market. This should elevate the pressure on safeguards and diplomatic interventions to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.