Nuclear Security During Decommissioning Fuel Cycle Facilities: Best Practices And Considerations

As nuclear facilities age in many countries, increasing numbers of nuclear power reactors, research reactors and nuclear fuel cycle manufacturing and processing facilities are being permanently shut down. With this increasing number of facilities approaching end of life and as countries elect to decommission facilities, there have been concerns raised that the security of nuclear materials and sensitive equipment may not be adequately provided during this phase of facility lifecycle in some countries. This paper will discuss the number and types of fuel cycle facilities likely to start or undergo decommissioning over the coming decade and the implications for global nuclear security efforts. Most importantly, this paper will discuss unique security considerations for decommissioning fuel cycle facilities as compared to reactor facilities. In summary, a fuel cycle facility will not change its overall security posture during decommissioning, and may even increase its security posture in some ways due to an increased threat of theft during decommissioning operations. This is especially true if the decommissioning facility is co-located with operational facilities. The paper will discuss efforts to assure that all material is accounted for before, during, and after decommissioning, insider threat issues associated with theft of material, how the use of contractors affects facility/operator security posture, and associated security risks not directly related to material, such as essential equipment and information security. This paper will allow the authors to share accumulated best practices, as well as shape future best practices as the world moves to decommission decades old facilities to prepare for the next generation nuclear infrastructure.