NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTUTRE AS A TOOL OF MPC&A INDIGENIZATION IN RUSSIA

It is difficult to produce fissile materials, and in consideration of this fact rogue states will likely attempt to acquire stolen materials instead. The greatest potential source of such stolen fissile materials is Russia. The United States has responded to the potential risk of nuclear theft from Russia by helping Russia improve its control over nuclear materials. The bulk of U.S. efforts have been focused on installing or enhancing equipment for MPC&A at Russian nuclear facilities. While these technical upgrades are critically important, their efficient use depends on the extent to which nuclear site personnel are not only trained in technical skills, but also motivated and willing to perform these functions. There is growing evidence that Russian security culture is inconsistent with the nature and magnitude of modern threats, with personnel often failing to recognize the importance of following all the procedures and using the technologies necessary for protecting nuclear materials. Unless this issue is directly and comprehensively addressed, the Western security upgrades to Russian facilities will not be as efficient as originally thought. The paper describes peculiarities of personnel and equipment interface in Russia, focuses on the need to promote a nuclear security culture in Russia, and provides a set of recommendations to achieve this goal.