Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security

Year
2009
Author(s)
Donald Kovacic - Oak Ridge National Laboratory
John McClelland-Kerr - U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration
Mo Bissani - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Ana Raffo-Caiado - Oak RidgeNational Laboratory
Matthew C. Van Sickle - U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration
Kenneth Apt - Support Contractor
Abstract
Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often a challenge for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope production and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach should be adopted to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security—sometimes referred to as the “3S” concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has implemented bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote safeguards, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of nuclear safeguards infrastructure in countries with credible plans for nuclear energy as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. Developing an adequate safeguards infrastructure is critical to becoming a responsible “owner” of nuclear power. The 3S concept is the optimal path forward to achieving this goal