Year
2013
Abstract
The legacy of Soviet Georgia’s nuclear past played an important role in intensified integration of a newly independent state into international nonproliferation regime following the breakup of the Soviet Union. In 1994, Georgia became a fully-fledged member of the nonproliferation regime and since then, in cooperation with the IAEA and other international bodies has taken measures for the improvement of nuclear safety in the country, enhancing the security and physical protection of infrastructure of high-activity radiation sources, and responding to nuclear emergencies. The paper describes independent Georgia’s participation in the international architecture of nuclear security and reviews the challenges it faces. These challenges were largely related to the urgency of nonproliferation policy development, elaboration of integrated approach towards ensuring of nuclear and radiation safety, combating illegal transits and addressing issues of radioactive waste management. It is shown, that currently the government agencies work on the improvement of border control, radiological security and nuclear waste management. These issues are brought to the government’s day-to-day agenda by donors from the developed states of the West, mainly the US and the EU and it member states. However, Georgia has only addressed selected issues where it received the help of donors. Consequently, the government response other requirements of nuclear nonproliferation with less attention. These elements include: the implementation of an active consistent foreign policy serving non-proliferation goals, establishment of an efficient national legislation and the implementation of mechanisms on export control of arms and dual use goods. Besides, the government has to develop instruments that curb the root causes of illicit trafficking or improve the nation’s security culture to foster stability and more reliable safeguards against transnational threats in the future.