NUCLEAR MATERIAL MINIMIZATION THROUGH PACKAGING AND REMOVAL OF EXCESS SEPARATED PLUTONIUM INVENTORIES

The pace of fuel cycle research with plutonium materials worldwide has decreased significantlyover the last two decades resulting in excess legacy plutonium materials that can be used inweapons of mass destruction (WMD). Recent Nuclear Security Summits have highlighted the needfor a global commitment to minimize excess weapons usable separated plutonium inventories. TheUnited States Department of Energy-National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE-NNSA) hasbeen leading the effort with partners globally to facilitate removal and disposition of legacyplutonium. In recent years, DOE-NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3)and its partners have worked collaboratively with six countries and the European Commission todevelop and implement plans to characterize, stabilize, and package excess separated plutoniummaterials for removal and ultimate disposition. Since much of the infrastructure for working withplutonium in these research facilities had been dismantled, the handling of legacy plutoniummaterials to facilitate stabilization and repackaging for transport has entailed the development ofnew glove box facilities in many of the partner countries. In addition, since significant quantities ofseparated plutonium predicate the use of Category 1 transport of these materials, DOE-NNSA hasworked closely with transport companies, and U.S. and international regulatory authorities tofacilitate protocols for secure maritime transport of the plutonium materials. This paper willdescribe the DOE-NNSA M3 role in the removal and minimization of separated plutonium material.DOE-NNSA M3 facilitates the isotopic characterization of the plutonium materials, development ofthe packaging process flow sheets, design and development of the necessary glove boxinfrastructure for packaging operations, procedure development, and training of personnel. Inaddition, the paper will highlight the 9975 plutonium package certificate validation process with theregulators and review the safeguards protocol practiced in the plutonium packaging, storage, andtransport activities. Finally, the paper will describe the key considerations in developing a transportstrategy and the attributes of the operational plan. The paper will use the examples of plutoniumminimization campaigns completed with Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany and Japanto highlight the lessons learned.