Nuclear Latency, Nonproliferation and Disarmament

Nuclear latency can be viewed as the possession of most or all of the technologies, facilities, materials, expertise (including tacit knowledge), resources and other capabilities necessary for the development of nuclear weapons, without full operational weaponization. It largely derives technologically from the dual-use nature of the atom. The issue also has to be seen historically –involving the full range of capability possessed by aspiring, existing and former nuclear-weapon states, and the possible diffusion of nuclear-weapon relevant equipment and information via a number of outlets, including non-state nuclear supply networks, the Internet, etc. In this context, nuclear latency poses an over-the-horizon strategic technological challenge that could affect future nuclear proliferation and the prospects for disarmament. Neither the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) nor the other existing nonproliferation and arms control treaties reached directly address latency, and the concept is not fully encompassed and explored in the policy debates over nuclear weapon proliferation or the treaties, institutions and norms designed to address these threats through nuclear nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament. Iran’s nuclear program has raised attention to the issue at one end of the continuum, but latency is a reality for many non-nuclear-weapon states today, primarily as a result of spreading nuclear energy technologies and programs. It can be a strategy for some states, including those who will find ambiguity to be an optimal response to security while possibly avoiding international reactions from diplomatic isolation to sanctions to military options. Revitalized interest in disarmament has also highlighted latency at the other end of the continuum. In practice, latent capabilities will exist in a nuclear-weapon-free world, but they could, in some agreement, be merely recognized; sanctioned and fully preserved; or proscribed and dismantled to the extent possible. From the perspectives of both nonproliferation and disarmament, latency is a reality that can be seen as positive or negative but in either case complicates the achievement of the objective. Is nuclear latency unique? Is latency a condition for nuclear-weapon states and for many non-nuclear-weapon states? Can it be a strategy for proliferant states? Can it be a viable nonproliferation strategy? To what extent will latency exist if we are able to realize a nuclear–free world? What effect will latency have on future efforts to control or eliminate nuclear weapons? This paper will explore these issues in the context of longstanding aspirations to promote nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.