NUCLEAR INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING AND LONG-RUN FISSILE MATERIALS SECURITY

The long-term security of fissile materials and weapons technology demands diligence in the application of existing protection measures, plus incorporation of new measures in some cases. In addition to physical security and accountancy measures for materials, the control of nuclear materials production technology through export controls is increasingly critical as the industry evolves. While the risks of existing materials diversion may be immediate, the diffusion of information on materials production technology (and ultimately the technology itself) seems almost inevitable in the context of current nuclear industry trends. Structural consolidation within the nuclear industry is unmistakable. Within the last 20 years, all sectors of the industry have experienced consolidation and market integration, driven largely by excess capacity. These trends have been described as an instance of “globalization” - but lack the character of globalization experienced in other industries - where manufacturing capabilities are transferred to areas of low labor cost by direct foreign investment. Even so, many of the aspects of nuclear industry restructuring are characteristic of the globalization trend, and pose serious problems for export control at the global level. International structures in the post-cold war era (notably the Nuclear Supplier’s Group or NSG) face significant constitutional challenges in dealing with this threat. Superimposed on this challenge is the additional threat posed by transnational groups seeking nuclear or radiological capabilities. There is hope in the fact that consolidation has simplified and streamlined the industry, presenting some opportunity for industry self-regulation. Over this long run, the protection of fissile materials production technology, and the information that enables it, will be as important as the measures in the IAEA additional protocol. (See the companion paper by Mark Killinger on this topic). While the necessary export control processes needed in a “globalized” nuclear sector are not yet clear, they need to be seriously considered and made a priority for both industry and government action in the next decade. This work was sponsored by the Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NA-242), U.S. Department of Energy.