NPT Reform in the Second Nuclear Age

Year
2016
Author(s)
Halvor Undem - Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington
Hannah E. Haegeland - The Stimson Center
Abstract
Developments in the proliferation of nuclear technology have weakened the framework of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as the bedrock of the global nuclear order. While New START is a noteworthy step, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) a marked diplomatic feat for strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), truly substantial progress along the road to zero nuclear weapons is lacking. The JCPOA, by both halting Iranian progress towards the Bomb and addressing Iranian concerns over the right to enrich under Article IV of the NPT, is a unique model of a multilateral solution to a post-Cold War era nonproliferation challenge. This paper will look at developments in the context of a second nuclear age and suggest similarly creative solutions for bolstering the NPT in a multipolar era in which non-NPT states with nuclear weapons now play a major role. The traditional role of the P5 or NPT Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) has been overshadowed by a nuclear arms race in South Asia and unorthodox political movements like the Humanitarian Consequences Initiative and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The vitality of these political blocks demonstrates the growing number of states disaffected from NPT norms, as evident in the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The US-India 123 Agreement, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver for India that followed, constitute an admission of the failure of NPT norms to adequately address second nuclear era nonproliferation challenges. Elements of the NPT, an agreement conceived and adopted in a different era, require reexamination. This paper advocates a pivot from the traditional NPT paradigm and its bilateral Cold War hangover to the multi-stakeholder reality of current global nuclear developments. Both technical and policy adjustments are required to address the growing disillusionment of NPT non- nuclear weapons states (NNWS) and normalize South Asia’s two states with nuclear weapons. This shift can be initiated through several actions that NAM states and the P5 could take to enhance access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy balanced with a continued appreciation for the requirement of international nuclear safeguards.