Novel Authentication of Monitoring Data Through the Use of Secret and Public Cryptographic Keys

The Office of Nuclear Verification (ONV) is supporting the development of a prototype system to provide data authentication and protection fo r a suite of monitoring sensors as part of a larger effort to create an arms control technology toolkit. This devi ce , currently called the Red Box, leverages the strengths of both symmetric and public cryptographic keys to authenticate, digitally sign, and pass along monitoring data to allow for host review, and redaction if necessary, without the loss of confidence i n the authenticity of the data by the monitoring party. The design of the Red Box will allow for the addition and removal of monitoring equipment and can also verify that the data was collected by authentic monitoring equipment prior to signing the data a nd sending it to the host for review. The host will then forward the data to the monitor for review and inspection. This paper will highlight the progress to date of the Red Box development, and will explain the novel method of leveraging both symmetric and asymmetric (secret and public key) cryptography to authenticate data within a hypothetical warhead monitoring regime.