Year
2007
Abstract
The U.S.-proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) provides major opportunities to strengthen the international nonproliferation system. The primary nonproliferation benefit derives from the promise of nuclear fuel cycle services (assured fuel supply and spent fuel take-back) to states as an incentive to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Another potential benefit is the deployment of new reactor and fuel cycle technologies that are more proliferation resistant than current designs and that limit the further accumulation of separated stocks of civil plutonium. GNEP also presents opportunities to modernize and improve international safeguards technologies and approaches, and foster greater peaceful nuclear sharing in keeping with the promise of Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Realizing these gains, however, will require political will, resources, and consensus. None of these benefits can be assured, but the proliferation risks and costs of inaction are too great to avoid trying. We must take steps towards a new, safer and more secure international nuclear fuel cycle.