Non-Proliferation Application of Off-the-shelf Detector(s) for Research Reactors

The implications of uncontrolled nuclear materials located throughout the world have been identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards department and the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a real and present concern regarding nuclear proliferation. The IAEA and NNSA have proactively created specific programs and initiatives that directly align to address this concern whose general mission is to (1) reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear material and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide, (2) deter potential non- compliers with costly penalties, and (3) help all parties demonstrate non-proliferation undertakings. In order to most effectively satisfy these objectives, one must first objectively quantify ‘vulnerability’ and secondly characterize such states (of vulnerability) of nuclear and radiological materials so as to prioritize those ‘sites worldwide’ which are of higher risk than others. The integral risk of nuclear proliferation set upon citizens worldwide has reduced dramatically as said programs continue to successfully meet the lofty goals set upon them. Continuing the proactive nature of the IAEA and NNSA, one must continue to identify potential future risks which may occur near and long term. One component that has continued to be difficult for both programs is the non-invasive inspection of on- line research reactors with the objective of identifying the quantity of fissile materials in such facilities. Recently, novel techniques for remote inspection have advanced third parties’ abilities to make quite accurate predictions on the intensity of ionizing radiation being emitted from an activated specimen through the emission of the Cherenkov light that is off put from said specimen. However, this relative intensity does not necessarily have much tangible value for safeguards inspection purposes as it is unable to capture fissile material quantities. This study seeks to leverage the existing technology of the Cherenkov detector and attempt to relate its intensity signature to quantity of fissile material. The outcome of this work will lead to a detector that quantifies, in an idealized setting, material signatures in research reactors from remote distances through the (Cherenkov) light that such a facility emits.