Year
2003
Abstract
For more than three decades, from the seventies to the end of the last century, Euratom remained one of the most stable parameters in the Safeguards World. End of 2002 however, the Commission considered appropriate to review the mission statement of the Safeguards Office and to adjust its operations to the present needs and policies of the European Union. Following the recommendations of a High Level Experts Group (HLEG), the Commission decided to integrate the Euratom Safeguards in the Direction General for Energy and Transport (DG TREN) and to adopt the suggested mission statement. Further, the commission took note of the HLEG report and requested from the Safeguards services to redefine in its light the Safeguards objectives, to adjust the Safeguards Goals as appropriate and to develop the necessary methodology and working procedures for implementation. The main messages to be considered from the HLEG report were on one hand to give the clear mandate to the Commission’s Safeguards Service to continue its role foreseen in the Euratom Treaty, on the other hand to stop orienting the activities of this service towards the IAEA Safeguards that are designed under pure nonproliferation aspects. Further, the role of the operators and national authorities in the “handling of Nuclear Materials in a Secured and Accountable way” had to be revisited, as the experts strongly suggested to depart from the mentality of considering European operators as “potential divertors” and to make more use of their control systems for making conclusions. This paper presents the new structure of the Euratom Safeguards service and its position within the European Commission. It describes the status of the progress made in order to implement to the extent possible the HLEG report recommendations. It reports on the work made on the way towards a more intelligent mode of operation aiming at the provision of conclusive safeguards statements using the available resources. It also elaborates on the difficulties encountered in particular as the new overall approach had to be developed in parallel with the implementation of the “old system” safeguards. It addresses the possible impact of the new orientation on the relation of Euratom to its partners, in particular to the IAEA. The Commission wishes for example, to have re-discussed with the IAEA some implementation aspects of the NPA in order to also improve the efficiency of its own operations. Further, an outline of the present discussion within the European Commission on subjects related to the future pacific use of Nuclear Energy is included. Here safety and security are the predominant aspects mention. Finally the picture is completed with issues related to the implementation of the AP and to the imminent Enlargement of the European Union.