Year
2006
Abstract
Introducing neptunium into the nuclear fuel cycle has been proposed in the past as a way to impede the diversion or the direct use of plutonium to fabricate a nuclear explosive device. This paper aims to technically analyze the industrial consequences should this proposal be implemented. Two scenarios are considered: 1) adding neptunium to fresh uranium oxide (UOX) fuel before irradiation in a light water reactor; 2) separating neptunium together with plutonium from used UOX fuel and using this combined oxide to fabricate mixed oxide (MOX) fuel before subsequent irradiation in a light water reactor. In both cases, assembly calculations for a pressurized water reactor using fresh fuel doped with neptunium are presented for a wide range of neptunium proportions. Consequences on core and fuel performances and the fuel cycle are analyzed. These are weighed against the potential proliferation resistance benefits of adding neptunium due to the increased quantity of the plutonium isotope 238Pu in the discharged fuel, or due to the potentially increased detectability through gamma ray emissions of a plutonium-neptunium oxide mixture. Finally, the proliferation risk presented by neptunium itself is discussed.