Moving Toward Multilateral Mechanisms for the Fuel Cycle

Year
2009
Author(s)
Michael D. Rosenthal - Brookhaven National Laboratory
Michael D. Rosenthal - Brookhaven National Laboratory
Michael D. Rosenthal - Brookhaven National Laboratory
Alexander Panasyuk - Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy
Alexander Panasyuk - Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy
Alexander Panasyuk - Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy
Gleb V. Efremov - International Uranium Enrichment Center, Russian Federation
Gleb V. Efremov - International Uranium Enrichment Center, Russian Federation
Gleb V. Efremov - International Uranium Enrichment Center, Russian Federation
Abstract
Multilateral mechanisms for the fuel cycle are seen as a potentially important way to create an industrial infrastructure that will support a nuclear renaissance and at the same time not contribute to the risk of nuclear proliferation. In this way, international nuclear fuel cycle centers for enrichment can help to assure a supply of nuclear fuel that will reduce the likelihood that individual states will pursue this sensitive technology, which can be used to produce nuclear material directly usable in nuclear weapons. Multinational participation in such mechanisms can also potentially promote transparency, build confidence, and make the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards more effective or more efficient. At the same time, it is important to ensure that there is no dissemination of sensitive technology. The Russian Federation has taken a lead role in this area by establishing an International Uranium Enrichment center (IUEC) for the provision of enrichment services at its uranium enrichment plant located at the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex (AECC). This paper describes how the IUEC is organized, who its members are, and the steps it has taken both to provide an assured supply of nuclear fuel and to ensure protection of sensitive technology. It also describes the relationship between the IUEC and the IAEA and steps that remain to be taken to enhance its assurance of supply. Using the IUEC as a starting point for discussion, the paper also explores more generally the ways in which features of such fuel cycle centers with multinational participation can have an impact on safeguards arrangements, transparency, and confidence-building. Issues include possible IAEA safeguards arrangements or other links to the IAEA that might be established at such fuel cycle centers, impact of location in a nuclear weapon state, and the transition by the IAEA to state-level safeguards approaches.