Year
2003
Abstract
Abstract For a number of years, the emphasis in materials control and accountability (MC&A) policy and analysis has been very heavily on the detection of deliberate theft and diversion. This emphasis while probably appropriate has caused both MC&A professionals and the broader security community to lose sight of other important functions of MC&A. The purpose of this paper is to remind us as safeguards and security professionals of two of these other functions and to explore some of the implications for MC&A policy. The first of these other functions of MC&A is to provide security managers timely and accurate information concerning quantities and locations of nuclear material in order that an appropriate level of physical protection be provided against external threats. The second other function is to provide assurance to the public that materials are being properly managed controlled and accounted for. In the financial world, publicly held corporations are required to maintain a proper accounting system, and to report quarterly to the shareholders and the appropriate regulatory authorities both the financial results of operations for the preceding accounting period and the overall financial position of the firm at the end of the accounting period. This reporting is done through the publication of financial statements prepared by the firm and certified by outside independent auditors. For DOE, the analogous purpose of the MC&A system is to assure the American people that DOE nuclear materials are being properly managed and controlled. From the observation that MC&A is about more than loss detection, it follows that requirements for MC&A systems need to be based on more than just loss detection. In this paper, we discuss some of implications of that observation for requirements for physical inventories, accounting records systems, control of material transfers, and other aspects of MC&A.