MINIMIZATION OF PROLIFERATION RISK EXPOSURE ON THE PHASE OF TRANSITION TO TWO-COMPONENT NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM

Potential threat of fissile materials usage for the terrorist purposes is being widely discussed problem of nuclear power nowadays. As it was shown in different papers the estimation of the whole fuel cycle by criterion of nonproliferation has relative character and essentially depends on specific features of the organization and the general strategy of the fissile material management. One of possible approaches to quantitative estimation of proliferation risk with account of structure and the fuel cycle organization was developed by Krakowski and submitted in the concept “risk exposure”. In Krakowski’s concepts the proliferation risk is connected with amount and form of plutonium at various stages of the fuel cycle. The form of plutonium determines degree of its attractiveness and availability from the point of view of possible undeclared use. Summation on all considered time intervals gives a measure of the fuel cycle vulnerability - so-called risk exposure. Within the framework of this concept the transition to one of possible variants of innovational development of global nuclear power system - the closed fuel cycle with fast reactors without breeding of fissile fuel materials is considered. As a tool of carrying out the multiple dynamic optimization calculations modules of MESSAGE model are used. To solve the task the fuel cycle model of two-component global nuclear power system was constructed in the form of the generalized energy stream networks. The basic elements of the closed fuel cycle, which are important from the nonproliferation point, were included in the model. There are storages of thermal and fast reactors’ spent nuclear fuel, storages of the separated plutonium, reprocessing and production of uranium fuel and MOX fuel technology in the model. The structure of global nuclear power on the phase of transition from present unicomponent nuclear power with the collected plutonium in different forms up to the established development of two-component nuclear power with fast reactors and lack of plutonium in an external fuel cycle by criterion of minimization of potential plutonium proliferation risk is optimized. The cumulative proliferation risk exposure for various scenarios of global nuclear power development is calculated.