Year
2004
Abstract
More than four years ago, in February 2000, Germany completed the necessary legal steps to prepare for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol (AP). Together with the EURATOM Safeguards Office, as Germany does not have a domestic safeguards authority, a series of actions was initiated and carried out to enable German operators to understand and accomplish their new duties under the AP. Now, with the entering into force of the AP on April 30, 2004, it is time to look ahead to shape the prospective integrated safeguards system. As we hope and expect, the new integrated safeguards system will be a thoroughly revised and optimized system that grants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the necessary scope and flexibility to focus on areas of real concern and to respond to alarming events in an adequate manner, such as significant unresolved questions and inconsistencies, significant anomalies, and safeguards implementation problems. Our expectations with regard to the general structure of integrated safeguards aim more at an event driven and less at a procedure driven system like the present system. Though Germany is phasing out of nuclear energy use for electricity production, the related safeguards tasks are not phasing out in the foreseeable future. About one-half of German nuclear power plants have a license to use MOX fuel. Most of the power plants build or intend to build on-site interim dry-storage facilities for spent fuel. Therefore, a lot of work will have to be done towards the implementation of concrete approaches and measures under integrated safeguards in the German facilities.