Lessons Learned in International Safeguards Implementation and the Potential Impact on Future Proliferation: The Case of Iran

In August 2002, an Iranian exile opposition group exposed the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities for uranium enrichment and heavy water production in Iran. Since then, the IAEA has sought to gain a complete picture of the history of the Iranian nuclear program. These efforts have sought not only to return Iran to its NPT and full-scope safeguards agreement commitments, but also the creation of greater assurances in the form of an additional protocol (AP). Thus far, progress has been mixed, yet Iran has not been punished for any of its past violations. By giving limited concessions over a period of time, Iran’s strategy of selective implementation of international safeguards features have resulted in delays that may have provided a path toward a clandestine nuclear weapon breakout capability while appearing to be in full compliance of its safeguards commitments. A larger danger exists if other potential violators use these same flaws in the NPT and the IAEA’s enforcement of safeguards commitments to achieve their own nuclear weapon breakout capability. This paper will seek to analyze how and where these opportunities for delay have occurred and what measures might be taken in the future to bring greater credibility and effectiveness to implementing and verifying international safeguards. In states with apparent violations of safeguards agreements, this paper will also examine ways to facilitate an IAEA declaration of noncompliance and subsequent penalty determination.