The‌ ‌Language‌ ‌of‌ ‌Nuclear‌ ‌Security‌ ‌-‌ ‌New‌ ‌Case‌ ‌Studies

This project connects three unique disciplines: nuclear security, open source information, and linguistics. The security of nuclear materials is a relatively new field with its origins in the 20th century. Consequently, communication occurs in limited organisational contexts, through specialised language with professional standards, phrases, jargon and acronyms. To explore the niche availability of information, we have been gathering data through four case studies. An exploratory study on Turkey and Turkish was presented at the 2018 INMM meeting in Palm Desert. We have now expanded this dataset, and added Jordan, India and Pakistan as well. We have paid particular attention to openly available information, looking at categories (e.g. government, industry, media), themes (e.g. energy, economy), and source quality (conceptual accuracy). Overarching, we have considered how this information is affected by the language in which it is presented. The case studies illustrate how someone may struggle to acquire useful information on nuclear security. We are examining the significance of gaps in information as well as any miscommunication. It is important to map limitations in national-level information availability because concepts do not necessarily translate across languages, countries or cultures. Sometimes translation is not possible, or even damaging; fixing a meaning that may not exist in the first place. Accordingly, non-native speakers using, for instance, a dictionary or an online automated translation tool may not gather the full meaning of what is communicated. Such discrepancies lead to misunderstandings and frustrations but also differences in the way problems are perceived and responded to.Specifically, language-use in the nuclear community has become functionally stratified: frequently two or more languages are used under different conditions within a speech community (e.g. work versus home). Despite this, nuclear language has not yet been thoroughly charted or defined; not as an international concept by itself, nor the variety between different national languages. Ultimately, it is our aim to 1) encourage the nuclear community to look beyond internationally dominant languages; both in acquiring information, and in publishing information in the first place, and 2) to contribute to clarifying the language of nuclear security and enhance global nuclear security practices.