International Safeguards and Compliance Under the NPT

Concerns about weapons of mass destruction over the past year, especially regarding Iraq and North Korea, have increased government, media and public awareness of the IAEA inspection process for verification under the NPT. Questions have been raised about non-compliance under the NPT, most recently about Iran. This paper deals with the role played by IAEA safeguards. It considers the cases: when a State is in compliance, when there are suspicions about compliance, and when a State is not in compliance. When confronted with possible safeguards violations, the IAEA tries to deal with the State concerned first through routine procedures and then with more and more intrusive measures. If necessary, the safeguards agreement allows the IAEA to carry out “special inspections”. The ultimate step is for the IAEA to bring its case to the Security Council of the United Nations. The non-proliferation regime has seen two serious instances of non-compliance: Iraq and North Korea. Had a proper trigger been available – inspections results or intelligence information – special inspections in Iraq before 1990 could possibly have unearthed the large clandestine program. After the Gulf War, the issue went directly to the Security Council, which passed a number of resolutions to castigate non-compliance. The strengthening of the nonproliferation regime calls for mechanisms to deal with possible non-compliance that underline the central role of verification organizations in confidence building. Enhancing international verification discourages non-compliance and provides for better long-term assurances.