INTERNATIONAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION ADVISORY SERVICE: OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Year
2000
Author(s)
Axel Hagemann - Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH
Mark S. Soo Hoo - Sandia National Laboratories
David Ek - Sandia National Laboratories
Terry Jenkin - Atomic Energy Control Board (retired)
Cris Price - Office of Civil Nuclear Security—U.K.
Bernard Weiss - International Atomic Energy Agency
Abstract
While individual States take responsibility for the security of nuclear materials and facilities, the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) program provides an international peer review of a State’s system of physical protection to assist States in their efforts. Since its inception in 1996, the purpose of the IPPAS program has been to provide advice and assistance to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member States on strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of their State system of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. To date IPPAS missions have been conducted in ten States. Based on the experience gained in conducting these missions, some observations can be made. The level of implementation of the guidelines provided in Information Circular 225, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225) varies from State to State. In some States, portions of the international guidelines are being incorporated into draft physical protection regulations. In other States, the guidelines have been fully adopted into national regulations. At the facility level, numerous recommendations relating to facility implementation of physical protection systems have been made. In April 2000, the IAEA convened an experts’ group meeting consisting of IPPAS mission team leaders and representatives from States in which an IPPAS mission was conducted. While the experts’ group was unanimous in its support for the program, it made a number of suggestions for improvement. Significant among these suggestions was developing wider acceptance for the program, strengthening mission follow-up activities, and changing the nature of future missions to reflect the latest revision of INFCIRC/225, particularly concerning Design Basis Threat and protection against sabotage.