INTERNATIONAL METHODOLOGY FOR PROTECTION AGAINST INSIDER ADVERSARIES

Note: No final paper was submitted for the Proceedings. The insider adversary can be the most formidable adversary that a facility protection system must withstand. This threat posed by insider adversaries stems from the necessary level of knowledge, access, and authority over sensitive locations and sensitive materials that is entrusted to employees and other officials. The trust placed in these employees can be exploited to seriously degrade a protection system. To combat this, a protection system must layer different types of protection programs and activities to minimize the risk that an insider will attempt and succeed at committing theft or sabotage. These measures are complementary to, but different than those employed to prevent or defeat outsider adversaries. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the French Institut de RadioProtection et de Sureté Nucléaire (IRSN) embarked on a joint effort to develop a methodology to address insider adversaries for the international community. This effort involved developing a standard definition for the insider, incorporating existing IAEA programs related to Insider such as DBT and Vital Area, developing and organizing the features of insider protection, and defining a method to evaluate the effectiveness of the insider protection system for a facility. This paper will discuss the methodology for Insider protection that has been developed.