Year
2008
Abstract
In designing future nuclear energy systems and facilities, it is important to have a formalized process for ensuring that proliferation resistance and safeguards are adequately addressed during the early stages of the design process. This paper proposes the development of a structured methodology to systematically analyze a facility’s processes, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This methodology, which is modeled on the approach utilized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) [1] to integrate safety into the design and operation of nuclear facilities, may have applications that could be utilized to support the Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design (ISBD) project. The Integrated Proliferation Resistance Analysis (IPRA) process [2] discussed in this paper can be utilized as a framework for helping to determine the effectiveness of deterring and/or mitigating proliferation activities. Also, by developing the IPRA process, the designer will have a methodology to define the “safeguards” envelope for a plant in the same manner that the NRC safety process defines the “safety” envelope for a plant. Utilizing process flow sheets to identify potential diversion and facility misuse scenarios, the designer can identify and incorporate design features into the facility design to eliminate or mitigate these risks. Furthermore, utilizing systems and equipment that are already in place for a facility’s reliable and safe operation could reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistance features. The ultimate goal would be to integrate safety, security and safeguards into the design of nuclear facilities to prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state levels. The design and operation of a nuclear facility has many stakeholders: the facility designer, the facility operator, members of the public and regulatory agencies, such as the Department of Energy (DOE) and the NRC and potentially the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The development of the formalized process for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of nuclear facilities would incorporate input and feedback from the designers, operators and regulatory agencies. Ultimately, this would result in a process that increases the confidence of the public that facilities are being regulated in the safeguards arena with the same rigor as is utilized in the safety arena. This integrated approach discussed in this paper supports the goals of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative [3] and would also facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards in a manner to reduce the life cycle costs for both the operator and the IAEA.