Integration of Domestic MC&A Requirements and International Safeguards Objectives

While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic material control and accounting (MC&A) and physical protection are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. As such, the primary focus of international safeguards is the verification of a State’s declaration concerning its use of peaceful nuclear energy, and the primary focus of domestic MC&A is the actual control and physical protection of nuclear material and related facilities. The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated projects through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and more specifically its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program, to develop technologies that support domestic regulatory requirements for materials control and accounting (MC&A), more specifically those of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). However, since new nuclear energy systems deployed in the U.S. may be offered for international safeguards in support of the U.S. Voluntary Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and since nuclear energy systems developed in the U.S. may eventually be exported, international guidelines and requirements are also of interest. Consequently, it is important to note the vital connection between domestic MC&A and international (e.g., IAEA) safeguards. As stated in paragraph 7 of the IAEA’s INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), “...the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards ... and ... such safeguards shall be applied in such a manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining there has been no diversion of nuclear material ...” Thus, the domestic system of accounting and control provides the foundation for international safeguards. As implied by paragraph 7 of INFCIRC/153, a MC&A system that has been designed with consideration of IAEA safeguards objectives can reduce the complexity/cost of the international safeguards system and potentially reduce the complexity of the facility, hence directly reducing the IAEA cost of safeguards and indirectly reducing the operator’s cost of operation. This paper will discuss the inter-connectedness of domestic MC&A requirements and international safeguards objectives, and how this relationship can be used to help guide related technology research and development as well as facility design.