AN INTEGRATED SAFETY-SECURITY PROCESS FOR EVALUATING CONSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED ACTS OF SABOTAGE

When combating threats with an organic capability equal to or less than the applicable design basis threat (DBT), protection systems are expected to effectively counter (prevent successful completion of) any attempted sabotage. However, if for some reason it becomes desirable to evaluate a facility in light of postulated threats sufficiently different from or otherwise not obviously bounded by the DBT, it may be necessary to consider not just the effectiveness of the protection system, but the response of the affected vital areas, components, and possible mitigating systems as well in order to characterize possible radiological consequences. Such an integrated security-safety process is described by this paper. Note that the coupling of security and safety analyses in the way presented militates for the use of performance-based security evaluation methods in order to generate probabilistic effectiveness measures suitable as input for the final safety radiological consequence or risk analysis calculations for a specific facility.