INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS - A CASE OF THE GOOD BEING THE ENEMY OF THE BEST?

“Integrated safeguards” are intended to represent the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols which achieves maximum effectiveness and efficiency within available resources. The purpose of integrating classical and strengthened safeguards measures is to achieve costeffectiveness. The Agency has only a finite budget, and Member States expect efficiencies before considering budget increases. Fundamental to integrated safeguards is the elimination of redundancies—by focusing on detection of undeclared nuclear activities, strengthened safeguards address a shortcoming in classical safeguards, enabling reductions in routine safeguards intensity. A goal therefore is to establish appropriate levels for routine safeguards activity—and to ensure that classical and strengthened safeguards effectively complement each other. The first priority for safeguards is to provide assurance on the observance of non-proliferation commitments. Here, the principal technical challenge is the development of effective measures to detect undeclared nuclear activities. If efficiencies could not be achieved without compromising effectiveness, this must be brought to the attention of Member States. To date however this has not been demonstrated (this point should not be confused with the issue of the overall adequacy of the safeguards budget)—and judgments on the performance of the safeguards system should be made on the basis of the system as a whole, looking at the complementarity of its various components. The concept of integrated safeguards has been before the Board of Governors a number of times, integrated safeguards have been under development for some 2½ years, and practical application has begun. However, there are lingering concerns that cost considerations will lead to unacceptable compromises—indicating some misgivings about integrated safeguards as a concept. The objectives of integrated safeguards—effectiveness combined with efficiency—clearly represent a desirable, or “good”, outcome. Do integrated safeguards, however, work against the “best” outcome, which some may perceive as the continuation of current measures on declared nuclear material as well as strengthened safeguards? The paper outlines the directions taken in the development of integrated safeguards, some of the major changes in the application of classical safeguards, and whether these could result in adverse outcomes.