Integrated Safeguards and Security Performance Assurance Program

Threats to national critical assets have been under constant study and assessment, as well as plans that should be an integral part of a Department of Energy (DOE) / National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Site Safeguards, and Security Plan(s) SSSP and vulnerability analysis set of processes. The Design Basis Threat (DBT) Policy presents a challenge with respect to how well protection strategies are assessed, validated, and incorporated. Because the DBT identifies outsider and insider threats to our national assets, and resource allocations and/or executable funds are limited, it is imperative that the appropriate level of system and/or system component performance tests are specific and clearly tied to the vulnerability analysis set of processes along concentric layers of protection. Risk decisions are dependent on performance based vulnerability analysis results and should be supported by a Performance Assurance Program (PAP) Plan that incorporates and integrates the appropriate level of safeguards and security validated critical system elements. Although safeguards can encompass a total security program, safeguards used for the purposes of this paper is referring to Material Control and Accountability (MC&A), and security is referring to physical security and all other elements (e.g., systems, cyber, information security, protective force, etc.). In order to capture safeguards and security system effectiveness adequately, a measurable performance assurance program needs to provide safeguards and security systems and/or system components performance results for those systems providing essential protection Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) needs to be evident with respect to plan administration, management and organizational responsibilities, and implementation procedures. This paper attempts to address the importance of integrated safeguards and security critical systems and/or critical system components, planning of performance tests, evaluation of test results, after action review, and identification of issues. Corrective actions for identified deficiencies and root cause analysis are also included along with validation and closure of corrected deficiencies, or upgrades to the overall security system, which can make an identified deficiency a non-issue in the overall protective system. Views presented in this paper do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration, and are primarily based on experience and subject matter expert opinion or information. References used for this paper are cited on the last page.