Information Sensitivities/Classification Issues in an Arms Control Verification Regime and What Approaches Might Make Sense

While many experts have suggested potentially mirroring Safeguards verification approaches as a possible method of Arms Control verification, the nuclear weapons environment poses multiple problems that are not found in the Safeguards environment. Safeguards verification activities are directly driven by requirements for adherence to international monitoring agreements, while traditional Arms Control agreements have focused only on specific areas of arms reduction between two nuclear weapons states, (i.e. the reduction or removal of a specific type of warhead, or the removal of a launching mechanism from use). Part of that process includes the presentation of a list of prioritized, inspecting-party “wants,” which are later used to negotiate with the host party until the impacts of the inspector’s wants have been mitigated to a manageable level against the host’s need to protect its information. This process has been effective in the traditional realm of Arms Control agreements. Previous treaties such as INF and START contained verification components focused on missile payload, and included options for activities such as continuous portal monitoring and on-site inspections; however, there have not been agreements established which include verification of the warhead itself. When considering the development and deployment of a warhead verification regime, the topic of information sensitivity/classification is an area which provides some of the most significant issues and constraints to regime development. For the purpose of this paper, the information sensitivity/classification topic area can be broken into two major components: information security, which deals primarily with any data that would be generated, shared or released, and operational security information, which directly involves anything that could be observed, revealed or garnered from behaviors, and could reveal sensitive operations information (i.e. security postures, transportation behaviors, or variances in operational behaviors associated with operating changes). This paper will discuss recommendations on approaches and methodologies which could mitigate encroachment into sensitive topic areas, and promote the collaborative development of verification activities which could be more readily acceptable by both the host and inspecting parties.