Information Security and Authentication - A Trilateral Initiative Challenge

Within the framework of the Trilateral Initiative, technical challenges have arisen due to the potential of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring fissile material with classified characteristics, as well as the IAEA using facility or host country supplied monitoring equipment. In monitoring material with classified characteristics, it is recognized that not only does the host country need to assure that classified information is not made available to the IAEA inspectors, but likewise the IAEA wants assurances that they will receive correct information about such materials which satisfies the IAEA’s needs of verification. Thus, any monitoring equipment used to monitor material with classified characteristics has to contain information security capabilities, such as information barriers. In using host-country-supplied monitoring equipment, regarding the material being monitored the IAEA has to have confidence that the information provided by the equipment is genuine and can be used by the IAEA in fulfilling its obligation to derive conclusions based on independent verification measures. Thus the IAEA needs to go through the process of authenticating the monitoring equipment. The fact that monitoring equipment needs to exhibit information security while at the same time be capable of being authenticated necessitates the need for creative technical approaches to be pursued.