INCENTIVES FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY

Year
2005
Author(s)
Matthew Bunn - Harvard University
Abstract
Effective systems and procedures to ensure security for nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear materials are expensive and often inconvenient. Hence, strong incentives exist to cut corners on nuclear security – for states and ministries to provide fewer resources than needed, for facilities to invest what resources they have in activities directed toward generating revenue or fulfilling their principal missions, and for individuals not to follow burdensome security procedures. This paper outlines approaches under which U.S. policy and policies by other key governments could provide incentives to put in place effective nuclear security, at the state or ministry level, at the facility level, and at the individual level. Effective regulatory approaches, decisions not to provide lucrative U.S. government contracts to foreign facilities that have not demonstrated strong nuclear security, and steps to ensure that actions related to nuclear security are appropriately included in individual performance reviews and facility-level performance fees are among the kinds of incentives that could be considered. Ultimately, maintaining effective nuclear security should be part of the “price of admission” for doing business in the international nuclear marketplace. Without such incentives, current programs to cooperate in improving nuclear security worldwide may not succeed in putting in place nuclear security systems and procedures that provide genuinely effective security and will be sustained for the long haul.