Year
2013
Abstract
The central principle of the international law of arms control is that there are no rules by which the level of armaments of states is limited except those to which the state itself consents. In the interest of achieving the broadest possible adherence, multilateral arms control treaty regimes focused on weapons of mass destruction provide for a range of incentives to become and remain a State Party, such as codification of the right of peaceful development, while offering a way out in the form of a withdrawal clause. Both of these elements are found in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The conditions for withdrawal from the NPT require that extraordinary events have jeopardized the State’s supreme interests, though the text allows the state substantial discretion in making this determination. At the same time, in the event of non-compliance by a State Party, the institutional enforcement mechanisms available under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are quite weak. Taking the role of enforcer, the Security Council has consistently deemed the proliferation of nuclear weapons to be a threat to international peace and security, thereby triggering the UN collective security system and its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – being able to take measures binding on all states. Actions taken under these powers since the turn of the century have included requiring states to enact certain domestic legislation (Resolution 1540), demanding North Korea’s return to the NPT (essentially overriding the consent element), and deciding that Iran must suspend all enrichment activities. This paper expounds upon whether such actions fall under the Security Council’s competences, whether such actions denote a shift toward allowing for extraordinary measures to deal with the threat of nuclear proliferation, and what the broader implications are for the further development of the non-proliferation regime.