Implementation of An Unattended Safeguards Approach To The Transfer of Spent Fuel Into Interim Dry Storage

In today’s commercial nuclear environment spent fuel bundles are being removed from wet storage areas, encased in containers and stored at interim dry storage facilities all over the world. Expanding IAEA tasks are challenging the Agency to develop better and more inventive ways to maintain continuity of knowledge of this spent fuel while it is transported to facilities where large caches of spent fuel are stored. This not inconsiderable task becomes less intimating by Inspector pre-planning, approved procedures and professionally installed reliable containment and surveillance equipment. Current approaches for the transfer of spent fuel in most cases include an on-site Inspector that monitors loading of spent fuel into transportation canisters. These loaded items are item counted and verified by use of an Agency NDA device. Numbers of Inspector days in the field are quite large because this method of verification is incredibly inefficient. The Agency’s yearly efforts to cover spent fuel transfer campaigns, has become a significant burden. An unattended approach to the monitoring of spent fuel transfers by the Agency will eliminate the need for constant Inspector coverage and minimize the number of man-days required per facility. Thereby, allowing valuable Inspector resources to be redirected to other more demanding areas of the world for Safeguarding efforts. A nuclear power plant located in Romania will be examined in this paper as a case study to demonstrate an improved method of monitoring and maintaining continuity of knowledge of the spent fuel being transferred from this operating CANDU reactor to an interim dry storage facility. This case study will include current Agency efforts that are expended as a result of constant Inspector presences and the eventual removal of this Inspector from the site during spent fuel transfers.