Year
2005
Abstract
While deliberate efforts to manage risks in the historic past have been purportedly traced as far back in time as 3200 B.C., modern systematic development of risk assessment methodologies and attendant management practices was given its first strong impetus following the disastrous Apollo test in 1967 that resulted in the tragic death of three astronauts. The first full-scale application of these methods was undertaken in the Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 published in 1975. Recognition of the need for systematic risk assessment in safeguards (including physical security) arose at roughly the same time. When the Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed Oxide was issued in 1974, it was criticized for the incompleteness of demonstrating the impact of safeguards—including a lack of technically sound arguments for the effectiveness of the analysis technique used. In response, as might be expected, safeguards and security papers published since that time often give explicit mention to risk in discussions on the design and evaluation of systems. However, a review of such papers will illustrate that, in general, certain risk factors (e.g., system effectiveness) are developed quantitatively to great lengths, while others (e.g., consequence) are left unmentioned or are given only cursory, qualitative development. The net result is that while while appearances are (at least to the uninitiated) that risk management has been implemented within a particular program or for a particular facility, it may be that, in effect, only best practice or due diligence (in a legal sense) is at work. The reasons for such disparate approaches toward the various risk factors are not clear. However, the present paper hopes to spur interest in developing a balanced approach toward assessing risk factors in general and in consequence assessment in particular, by illustrating the resulting impacts on performance requirements and measures of risk.