Year
2017
Abstract
Recent changes in the United States (U.S.) political landscape and global nonproliferation environment raise the possibility that the nuclear test moratorium, observed by the U.S. and Russian Federation for 25 years, may be at risk and could result in the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing at the U.S. test site in Nevada or at the Russian test site on the arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya. In addition to a myriad of public opinion and regulatory challenges that a resumption of testing would face, a nuclear test in the U.S. or Russia may be subject to the on-site monitoring regime of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and the Russian Federation that has remained in force since 1990. Like resuming nuclear testing after more than a 25-year hiatus, a resumption of TTBT nuclear-test-monitoring activities by either the U.S. or Russian side would face numerous personnel, equipment, and logistical obstacles. With an average age of over 60 years old, many of the U.S. and Russian personnel with experience as TTBT inspectors or test-site escorts have retired and some have died. Much of the TTBT monitoring equipment, most of it over 30 years old, has long ago either been assigned to other programs; been disposed of; or, is rusting in weed-infested salvage yards. Given the 200-day timeline from initial notification to the execution of a nuclear test, the time available for interagency decision making; conducting required training for experienced and inexperienced personnel; and, procuring and shipping new equipment would require an intricate ballet of planning and execution of the multiple phases of TTBT monitoring activities. While the full exercise of treaty rights is a standard policy, the feasibility of the U.S. and Russian Federation to fully, or even partially, exercise their rights under the TTBT would require significantly more funding, planning, and training than 200 days will allow.