IAEA STATE-LEVEL APPROACH FOR STATES WITH ONLY AN INFCIRC/153 SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT

In NPT non-nuclear weapon States without an Additional Protocol (AP), the IAEA plans safeguards on the basis of safeguards criteria that are applied primarily at the facility level. This paper examines whether the IAEA could develop a State Level Approach (SLA) for such States. Of particular interest is how to take into account State-level factors (SLF) that draw on information beyond the information about a State that is reported under INFCIRC/153 and verified by the IAEA . The paper concludes that, to a large extent: (1) the framework developed by the Secretariat for the development of SLAs could be generally applied; and (2) some SLF are as relevant where an AP is in force as where it is not. However, there are major differences. One is the lack of an AP. As a result, the IAEA should continue to use the planning assumption that undeclared activities cannot be excluded. Without an AP, declared nuclear activities can continue to mask the pursuit of undeclared nuclear activities, perhaps most so at declared facilities. In addition, since nuclear fuel-cycle related activities need not be reported, detection of such an unreported activity without nuclear material may have no safeguards relevance and, therefore, no deterrent effect. In order to design the implementation of safeguards to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in INFCIRC/153-only states, the IAEA needs to increase the intensity of safeguards on declared nuclear material and facilities. With respect to detecting undeclared nuclear activities, the IAEA has the same tools available as it does in the case of an AP to collect and analyze open source information. However, these tools are likely to be less effective than where an AP is in effect because of the relative lack of transparency. While a formal SLA can be developed for the INFCIRC/153-only case, it can use only a few SLF. Nonetheless, consideration could be given to SLF that would permit a relaxation of inspection intensity at facilities without changing the underlying non-exclusion assumption, for example, a State’s participation in a regional or multinational inspection arrangement.