IAEA SAFEGUARDS: THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE

The majority of IAEA Member States who have signed the NPT have concluded that their security interests are best served by denying themselves nuclear weapons and being seen to do so through acceptance of an international safeguards verification regime. The IAEA expends much of its safeguards effort on DNLEU, at the front-end of the fuel cycle, and on spent fuel. It is acknowledged that if such material is diverted it would require further processing in clandestine facilities before it can be used in weapons. Material accountancy at facilities in a State’s declared fuel cycle was considered to be the best way to detect such actions. Detection of a clandestine dedicated military fuel cycle was accepted to be the responsibility of States’ national technical means. Iraq’s breach of its NPT obligations demonstrated that such a fuel cycle is more attractive than previously assumed. As a consequence the IAEA has been given extended access rights to enhance its capability to detect clandestine activities and facilities in a State. The paper builds on these considerations in suggesting a cost-saving change to the IAEA’s safeguards approach for nuclear material at the front-end of the fuel cycle and for spent fuel.