Year
2012
Abstract
IAEA safeguards implementation is currently undergoing a conceptual transformation through further evolution of the State-level concept and the introduction of integrated processes for evaluating and verifying States’ compliance with their safeguards obligations. These changes involve, inter alia, re-evaluating the role of technology in the overall process and the need to maximize the value added through its role in safeguards implementation. The paper analyses the contribution of technology to the different stages of information collection, processing, evaluation and knowledge generation from the point of view of its impact on the soundness of safeguards conclusions and on increasing detection risks for potential proliferators. The different technologies applied at these different stages may be generally categorized into the broad classes of information and communication techniques; analytical laboratory-based methods; and measurement and other instruments available to support in-situ verification activities at defined locations. The role and potential value of safeguards-related technologies also differ significantly in their application to ‘classical’ verification tasks, which generally utilize the concept of independent accountancy and control measures in respect of declared nuclear materials, and their application in efforts to verify the ‘completeness’ of States’ declarations (i.e. the detection of any undeclared nuclear material or activities). While the paper analyses the role of all kinds of technologies applied in safeguards, more emphasis is placed on the role and potential of instrumentation available to safeguards inspectors during their in-field activities. A clear distinction is made between defining basic requirements for instrumentation addressing nuclear material accountancy and for field instruments supporting design information verification, complementary access and special inspection activities.