Year
2000
Abstract
As a result of the increased awareness of the proliferation potential of neptunium (Np) and americium (Am), and of emerging projects in peaceful nuclear programmes which could result in an increase in the available quantities of separated Np and Am, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted a document on the issue to the IAEA Board of Governors in November 1998. The Board was informed that, if available in sufficient quantities in separated form, Np and, with considerably greater difficulty, Am could be used to manufacture nuclear explosive devices. The Board considered the item at length at its meetings in December 1998, and March, June and September 1999. The options for action put forward by the Secretariat comprised (a) designating Np and Am as special fissionable material and placing them under safeguards; (b) implementing, with the voluntary co-operation of States, measures to monitor international transfers of separated Np and Am and activities at relevant facilities that could result in separation of these materials using certain technical measures known as \"flow sheet verification\"; or (c) taking no action at this time. The Board concluded that designating Np and/or Am as special fissionable material would be premature, given the small amounts currently known to be available in separated form, and that doing nothing would pose a risk to the credibility of the safeguards system. In September 1999 the Board decided to authorise the implementation of the second option for the monitoring of Np. With regard to Am, the Board concluded that at present there was practically no proliferation risk, but asked the Director General to report relevant developments as to the availability of the material and emerging programmes in States which may lead to acquisition of such material. By the end of 1999, the Agency had initiated an exchange of letters with relevant States requesting their agreement to provide the necessary information and to the application of measures required for the monitoring scheme for Np. Letters will also be sent to a number of States inquiring as to whether they would, on a voluntary basis, provide information on separated Am. This paper will describe the technical background of the issue, the legal basis and Board conclusion, and the Secretariat plans for and current status of implementation of the IAEA’s efforts to monitor Np and Am.