IAEA DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS

In 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards embarked upon a programme for the development and implementation of “integrated safeguards”. The term refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency’s safeguards objectives within available resources. When fully implemented in a State, the measures provided by a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol will enable the Agency to draw safeguards conclusions and thereby provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole. A consultants’ meeting and three technical expert meetings held on this subject have facilitated the work of a group of safeguards specialists within the IAEA Secretariat who are developing the concept, plan and approaches for integrated safeguards. The work is proceeding with the assistance of a group of experts, with advice from the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) and with the help of a number of Member State Support Programmes. The concept being developed involves a State-level approach, which combines integrated safeguards approaches for specific facility types that take into account a State’s nuclear fuel cycle, the implementation of measures of its additional protocol, and other State-specific features. The Secretariat’s work on integrated safeguards is currently focused on the development of guidelines, approaches and implementation criteria. The work includes (a) specifying in detail the process by which a conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State can be drawn and maintained; and (b) having drawn this conclusion, considering what measures would then be appropriate to apply to declared nuclear material in specific types of facilities in order to continue to be able to draw conclusions of the non-diversion of such material. The paper will provide a current status of the development of integrated safeguards with particular emphasis on its conceptual aspects, main elements, and progress to date.