Radioactive material is at its most vulnerable stage during transportation. During transport, material resides outside of normal defined controls, and threats are not limited to what has been defined and protected against as part of the site’s design basis threat. For this reason, we take extra precautions to implement the appropriate security measures during transport. However, are we truly doing enough to ensure the human element of security as part of these measures? Those who plan, conduct, and oversee the shipment of radioactive material possess information that could be detrimental if it falls into the hands of those with malicious intent. In addition, the number of persons with direct or indirect access to this information can be extensive. If those supporting or conducting the transport are motivated to act in a way that does not align with their assigned roles and responsibilities, the contents of their shipment could be at risk. We must ensure that those involved in any aspect of the transportation of radioactive material are trustworthy, reliable, and capable of completing their activities as intended. This paper will address the human element of transport security, including insider threats, nuclear security culture, and human reliability programs.
Year
2020
Abstract