Year
2017
Abstract
In terms of international safeguards, France is among the most heavily controlled countries in the world. This situation is due to the development of its nuclear industry launched in the 70’s: 76% of electricity is produced in France by nuclear power reactors and the entire scope of nuclear fuel cycle facilities is present. It is also due to its commitment to support and contribute to strengthening the global non-proliferation regime. As a member of the European Union and party to the Euratom treaty, since 1957, all civil nuclear activities in France have been submitted to safeguards inspections carried out by the European Commission (representing about 37% of the total inspection effort in the European Union). In 2014, the European Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under the Euratom treaty and the French trilateral voluntary offer agreement (INFCIRC/290), used around 1500 Person Days Inspection (PDI) during 338 inspections in French nuclear facilities. After briefly describing the French organizational scheme in the field of safeguards, the paper will focus on the international commitments taken by France and how they translate in practical terms. The legal framework and the different means used to support the IAEA safeguards system will be detailed (scope of information provided, cooperation to test new safeguards approaches or equipment, inspectors training...). Eventually, the paper will aim to demonstrate how, in the French case, the implementation of international safeguards in a nuclear weapon state can contribute significantly to enhancing the non-proliferation regime and, despite its specificities, how it can ensure that non-nuclear weapons states have no commercial or industrial disadvantage in developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses, in reference to concerns raised by some countries during the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiation.