Hard boundaries versus soft boundaries – what are the conceptual advantages to safeguarding sensitive fuel cycle facilities under integrated safeguards.

Year
2009
Author(s)
John Carlson - Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
Russell Leslie - Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
Abstract
Under traditional safeguards, sensitive fuel cycle facilities (enrichment and reprocessing facilities) were safeguarded and evaluated using methodologies that did not explicitly take into account the state context in which the facility operated. For example, under traditional safeguards, a one million SWU enrichment facility operating in country A was subject to safeguards activities of exactly the same frequency and intensity as an equivalent facility in country B. While different safeguards technologies or procedures might be used due to the circumstances of the facility’s operation, the facility was seen by the Agency as existing in a “hard sided box” in which context was irrelevant. The advent of integrated safeguards (IS) allows the Agency to develop state level safeguards approaches in which each facility is examined in its national context. As a result the walls of the box are “softened”, context becomes critically important and actions taking place outside the box become relevant to safeguards consideration. This paper will look at the advantages and disadvantages to the hard sides vs soft sides approach with a view to recommending measures that can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards for sensitive fuel cycle facilities under integrated safeguards.