Year
2007
Abstract
There have been repeated proposals for establishing multinational cooperation approaches that could reduce the security concerns of spreading nuclear technologies. In 2005, a special study was done by an expert group set up by the IAEA and, recently, specific initiatives have been proposed by both the USA (GNEP) and Russia (GNPI) – each aimed at promoting nuclear power whilst limiting security concerns. The aim is that supplier countries make nuclear power available to users, but avoid transferring sensitive technologies. In practice, both initiatives place emphasis on the supply of reactors and enriched fuel but neither has made clear and specific proposals about the back-end part of the arrangement – in particular about disposal of foreign wastes. In the USA, the topic appears to be deliberately avoided; in Russia, the retention of wastes from reprocessing foreign fuel is the subject of a controversial public debate. The primary incentive offered to the user countries is “security of supply” of the front end services. However, there is no current shortage of supply of front end services, so that the incentives are not large. A much greater incentive could be the provision of a spent fuel or waste disposal service. The fuel supplied to Tier 2 countries could be shipped back (with no return of wastes) to the supplier or else to an accepted third party country that is trusted to operate safe and secure disposal facilities. If a comprehensive service that obviates the need for a national deep repository is offered to small countries then there will be a really strong incentive for them to sign up to GNEP or GNPI type deals.