Getting to Integrated safeguards: The new non-proliferation compliance standard

In 1997 the additional protocol to safeguards agreements between States and the IAEA was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and all States were urged to adopt one. For States with an additional protocol in force, the Agency is expected to make an annual statement that such States are in full compliance with their obligations, i.e., they are not conducting nuclear weapon activities. The Agency has established a process to support such annual statements, which includes concluding that there are no undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State, in addition to the previously drawn conclusion that diversion of declared nuclear material has not occurred. After the no undeclared nuclear activities safeguards conclusion is drawn for the first time, the State moves into a new category in which the Agency implements “integrated safeguards”. This has, in effect, established a new non-proliferation compliance standard for NPT non-nuclear weapon States: getting to integrated safeguards. Now and in the next few years, States with significant nuclear activities and good non-proliferation credentials are going through this transition. Completing it is more complex than might be thought, both for the Agency and for the State. In order to solidify the new compliance standard in the non-proliferation regime, it is important that this transition proceeds well and in a timely manner. This paper focuses on what is involved for a State and for the Agency in getting to integrated safeguards. With the revelations of undeclared nuclear activities in NPT States Iran and Libya in 2003 and 2004, it is not surprising that the Agency feels the necessity to be very careful. The implications of this will also be addressed.