Year
2000
Abstract
With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the way IAEA safeguards are implemented. While these changes are essential for strengthening international safeguards, their impact is not well understood. In order to characterize the effectiveness of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State’s nuclear activities and capabilities, and the old and new measures both have strengths and weaknesses. The value of adding INFCIRC 540 type measures is without question. As the new measures are integrated with the old, there are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, both independently and in combination, in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.